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Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Series Editor's Preface -- Acknowledgments -- List of Illustrations -- Introduction: Topic and Themes -- The Topic -- Themes: The Five C's -- Notes -- Chapter 1 Expanding the Continental Republic, 1811-1897 -- The First Ever Landing: Sally and the Sandwich, 1800 -- The No Transfer Resolution, 1811 -- The First Seminole War, 1814-1819 -- The Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny -- The Mexican War, 1846-1848 -- Filibusters, 1850s -- The Bombing of San Juan del Norte, Nicaragua, 1854 -- Notes -- Chapter 2 The Cuban Crucible: Experiments in Overseas Empire, 1898-1922 -- The White Man's Burden (and Other Justifications for Empire) -- The War of 1898 -- The First Cuban Occupation, 1899-1902 -- The Roosevelt Corollary -- The Second Cuban Occupation, 1906-1909 -- The Cuban Intervention of 1912 -- The Third Cuban Occupation, 1917-1922 -- Notes -- Chapter 3 Monopolizing the Central American Isthmus, 1903-1926 -- Panama 1903 -- Dollar Diplomacy -- Nicaragua, 1909-1925 -- Notes -- Chapter 4 Wilsonian Interventions, 1913-1919 -- Veracuz, 1914 -- Haiti, 1915-1919 -- Dominican Republic, 1916-1919 -- The Punitive Expedition, 1916-1917 -- Notes -- Chapter 5 Accommodation and Resistance, 1917-1930 -- Dominican Republic, 1917-1924 -- Haiti, 1917-1930 -- Nicaragua, 1927-1928 -- Notes -- Chapter 6 From Occupier to Good Neighbor, 1921-1936 -- Nonintervention from Harding to Roosevelt -- Nicaragua, 1928-1933 -- Haiti, 1930-1934 -- Cuba, 1933-1934 -- Panama, 1936-1939 -- Notes -- Chapter 7 Warding Off Global Ideologies, 1935-1954 -- A New Continental Security -- World War II Interventions -- The Cold War Inter-American System -- Guatemala, 1954 -- Notes -- Chapter 8 Containing Revolution, 1959-1990 -- Cuba, 1961 -- Dominican Republic, 1965-1966 -- Support for Military Régimes -- Nicaragua, 1979-1990 -- Grenada, 1983.

Whether rising up from fiery leaders such as Venezuela's Hugo Chavez and Cuba's Fidel Castro or from angry masses of Brazilian workers and Mexican peasants, anti U.S. sentiment in Latin America and the Caribbean today is arguably stronger than ever. It is also a threat to U.S. leadership in the hemisphere and the world. Where has this resentment come from? Has it arisen naturally from imperialism and globalization, from economic and social frustrations? Has it served opportunistic politicians? Does Latin America have its own style of anti Americanism? What about national variations? How does

Abstract: Scholars seem to share a blind faith than anti-imperialist alliances between states and/or non-state actors are, ipso facto, worthwhile and successful. Yet guerrilla leader Augusto Sandino's collaboration with allies from beyond his native Nicaragua brought him into a web of dependence that nearly destroyed his movement. For a few years, his support from Honduras, Mexico, and points farther away seemed to herald a far-reaching and powerful resistance movement to U.S. military interventions in Latin America. Yet the very fraying of some of those alliances compelled Sandino to leave his own rebellion and relocate to Mexico for almost an entire year in 1929–1930. There, he lost more allies than he made, as he found himself caught up in strategic and political disputes between Mexican and Soviet communists and between those same Mexican communists and the ideologically hardening Mexican state. While many ordinary Mexicans fêted Sandino, erstwhile partners isolated and nearly starved him of resources. Historians of Sandino's Mexican trip have noted its failure, but they have remained largely unconcerned with the meanings of the trip for the larger transformations occurring on the continent or the lessons it offered for transnational, multi-party alliances. Documents from Nicaragua, the United States, and Europe demonstrate that divided ideologies and structural weaknesses hobbled the many relationships at play from the start.

AbstractSpecial Counsel Robert Mueller's 2019 refusal to charge President Donald Trump with crimes resulted not only from what Mueller deemed insufficient evidence but also from the obstruction of the investigation itself, indicating an all‐too‐common pattern mitigating the independence of the judiciary when investigating the executive. The Iran‐Contra scandal of the Reagan–Bush era stands as a key antecedent when officials repeatedly destroyed evidence and impeded the work of investigators and courts to avoid punishment or embarrassment. While these acts may have been legal, they demonstrated the constitutional dependence of the judiciary on the executive for evidence and, more broadly, the lack of regard for the role of justice in a democracy.